48 results
5 - Climate, Violence and Ethnic Conflict in the Ancient World
- from Part I - Themes of Genocide through History
- Edited by Ben Kiernan, Yale University, Connecticut, T. M. Lemos, Huron University College, University of Western Ontario, Tristan S. Taylor, University of New England, Australia
- General editor Ben Kiernan, Yale University, Connecticut
-
- Book:
- The Cambridge World History of Genocide
- Published online:
- 23 June 2023
- Print publication:
- 04 May 2023, pp 150-182
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
The role of climate (including abrupt changes and extreme weather) in modern-era violence and conflict has received considerable attention in the past two decades from scholars in multiple fields, yet the mechanisms underlying (and even the reality of) such a role remains contested. Concern over projected climatic changes as a trigger for intensified violence, including mass killing and genocide, nonetheless continues to propel research. Data limitations are frequently cited as a challenge, yet comparatively few studies have turned to the millennia of human history documenting a broad range of violence against diverse social and environmental backgrounds. This chapter reviews evidence for ‘pathways’ by which climate may have contributed to violence and conflict in the Ancient Near East and Egypt. It emphasized religious, ideological, and ethnic dimensions that may have been catalysed by the psychological and material impacts of extreme weather to promote violence and conflict. In particular, we study state-enacted violence by the Neo-Assyrian Empire (909-611 BCE) and internal revolt in Ptolemaic Egypt (305-30 BCE). Newly available ice-core-based dates of explosive volcanism allow the examination of societal responses to the ensuing hydroclimatic shocks (also potentially ‘ominous’ volcanic dust-veils). These can be shown to closely precede documented increases in violence and conflict, including external warfare and internal revolt.
388 Early Neurorehabilitation of Disorders of Consciousness after Acute Hemorrhagic Stroke
- Part of
- Matthew Woodward, Shannon Arnold, Chris L. Wells, Vanessa Salasky, Brandon Overholt, Nicholas Morris, Neeraj Badjatia, Jamie Podell, Melissa Motta, Robynne Braun, Farra Dorman, Gunjan Parikh
-
- Journal:
- Journal of Clinical and Translational Science / Volume 7 / Issue s1 / April 2023
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 24 April 2023, p. 115
-
- Article
-
- You have access Access
- Open access
- Export citation
-
OBJECTIVES/GOALS: Accurate classification of disorders of consciousness (DoC) is key in developing rehabilitation plans following brain injury. The Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) is a sensitive measure of consciousness. We explore feasibility, safety and impact of CRS-R guided rehab in hemorrhagic stroke patients with DoC and evaluate predictors of recovery. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: Consecutive patients with non-traumatic hemorrhagic stroke, defined as subarachnoid hemorrhage (SAH) or intracerebral hemorrhage (ICH), receiving serial CRS-R assessments during their ICU stay at University of Maryland Medical Center from 2017-2021 were retrospectively identified. Outcomes of interest included the association with CRS-R and discharge disposition, therapy-based function and mobility and occurrence of safety events during CRS assessment. We also examined the association between CRS-R and physiological and anatomical injury pattern on electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), respectively. CRS-R RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: 76 patients with≥2 CRS-R assessments were identified (22 SAH, 54 ICH, median age = 59, 50% female). Median CRS-R completed was 3 with no SAEs identified during sessions. We identified 4 patterns: persistent VS/UWS (49%), persistent MCS or better (13%), emergence from VS/UWS to MCS or better (27%) and regression from MCS or better to VS/UWS (11%). Persistent low CRS-R correlated with older age in SAH (p=0.01), female gender in ICH (p=0.04), and history of diabetes (p=0.01). 2% of patients with final CRS-R DISCUSSION/SIGNIFICANCE: Early neurorehabilitation guided by CRS-R appears to be feasible and safe acutely following hemorrhagic stroke complicated by prolonged DoC and may enhance access to inpatient rehabilitation with a lasting benefit on recovery. Further characterization of DoC patterns and their correlation to clinical markers, including EEG and MRI is needed.
Australian local governments and affordable housing: Challenges and possibilities
- Alan Morris, Andrew Beer, John Martin, Sandy Horne, Catherine Davis, Trevor Budge, Chris Paris
-
- Journal:
- The Economic and Labour Relations Review / Volume 31 / Issue 1 / March 2020
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 01 January 2023, pp. 14-33
-
- Article
- Export citation
-
For an increasing proportion of Australian households, the Australian dream of home ownership is no longer an option. Neoliberal housing policy and the financialisation of housing has resulted in a housing affordability crisis. Historically, Australian housing policy has afforded only a limited role to local government. This article analyses the results of a nation-wide survey of Australian local governments’ perceptions of housing affordability in their local government area, the possibilities for their meaningful intervention, the challenges they face, the role of councillors and councils’ perceptions of what levels of government should take responsibility for housing. Almost all of the respondents from Sydney and Melbourne councils were clear that there is a housing affordability crisis in their local government area. We apply a framework analysing housing policy in the context of neoliberalism and the related financialisation of housing in order to analyse the housing affordability crisis in Sydney and Melbourne. We conclude that in order to begin resolving the housing crisis in Australia’s two largest cities there has to be an increasing role for local government, a substantial increase in the building of social and affordable housing and a rollback of policies that encourage residential property speculation.
Dynamics of diurnal cortisol and alpha-amylase secretion and their associations with PTSD onset in recent interpersonal trauma survivors
- Kerry L. Kinney, Uma Rao, Brooklynn Bailey, Natalie Hellman, Chris Kelly, Nicholas W. McAfee, Matthew C. Morris
-
- Journal:
- Psychological Medicine / Volume 53 / Issue 6 / April 2023
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 12 October 2021, pp. 2263-2273
-
- Article
- Export citation
-
Background
Dysfunction in major stress response systems during the acute aftermath of trauma may contribute to risk for developing posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The current study investigated how PTSD diagnosis and symptom severity, depressive symptoms, and childhood trauma uniquely relate to diurnal neuroendocrine secretion (cortisol and alpha-amylase rhythms) in women who recently experienced interpersonal trauma compared to non-traumatized controls (NTCs).
MethodUsing a longitudinal design, we examined diurnal cortisol and alpha-amylase rhythms in 98 young women (n = 57 exposed to recent interpersonal trauma, n = 41 NTCs). Participants provided saliva samples and completed symptom measures at baseline and 1-, 3-, and 6-month follow-up.
ResultsMultilevel models (MLMs) revealed lower waking cortisol predicted the development of PTSD in trauma survivors and distinguished at-risk women from NTCs. Women with greater childhood trauma exposure exhibited flatter diurnal cortisol slopes. Among trauma-exposed individuals, lower waking cortisol levels were associated with higher concurrent PTSD symptom severity. Regarding alpha-amylase, MLMs revealed women with greater childhood trauma exposure exhibited higher waking alpha-amylase and slower diurnal alpha-amylase increase.
ConclusionsResults suggest lower waking cortisol in the acute aftermath of trauma may be implicated in PTSD onset and maintenance. Findings also suggest childhood trauma may predict a different pattern of dysfunction in stress response systems following subsequent trauma exposure than the stress system dynamics associated with PTSD risk; childhood trauma appears to be associated with flattened diurnal cortisol and alpha-amylase slopes, as well as higher waking alpha-amylase.
Structured lifestyle education for people with schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder and first-episode psychosis (STEPWISE): randomised controlled trial
- Richard I. G. Holt, Rebecca Gossage-Worrall, Daniel Hind, Michael J. Bradburn, Paul McCrone, Tiyi Morris, Charlotte Edwardson, Katharine Barnard, Marian E. Carey, Melanie J. Davies, Chris M. Dickens, Yvonne Doherty, Angela Etherington, Paul French, Fiona Gaughran, Kathryn E. Greenwood, Sridevi Kalidindi, Kamlesh Khunti, Richard Laugharne, John Pendlebury, Shanaya Rathod, David Saxon, David Shiers, Najma Siddiqi, Elizabeth A. Swaby, Glenn Waller, Stephen Wright
-
- Journal:
- The British Journal of Psychiatry / Volume 214 / Issue 2 / February 2019
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 25 September 2018, pp. 63-73
- Print publication:
- February 2019
-
- Article
-
- You have access Access
- Open access
- HTML
- Export citation
-
Background
Obesity is a major challenge for people with schizophrenia.
AimsWe assessed whether STEPWISE, a theory-based, group structured lifestyle education programme could support weight reduction in people with schizophrenia.
MethodIn this randomised controlled trial (study registration: ISRCTN19447796), we recruited adults with schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder or first-episode psychosis from ten mental health organisations in England. Participants were randomly allocated to the STEPWISE intervention or treatment as usual. The 12-month intervention comprised four 2.5 h weekly group sessions, followed by 2-weekly maintenance contact and group sessions at 4, 7 and 10 months. The primary outcome was weight change after 12 months. Key secondary outcomes included diet, physical activity, biomedical measures and patient-related outcome measures. Cost-effectiveness was assessed and a mixed-methods process evaluation was included.
ResultsBetween 10 March 2015 and 31 March 2016, we recruited 414 people (intervention 208, usual care 206) with 341 (84.4%) participants completing the trial. At 12 months, weight reduction did not differ between groups (mean difference 0.0 kg, 95% CI −1.6 to 1.7, P = 0.963); physical activity, dietary intake and biochemical measures were unchanged. STEPWISE was well-received by participants and facilitators. The healthcare perspective incremental cost-effectiveness ratio was £246 921 per quality-adjusted life-year gained.
ConclusionsParticipants were successfully recruited and retained, indicating a strong interest in weight interventions; however, the STEPWISE intervention was neither clinically nor cost-effective. Further research is needed to determine how to manage overweight and obesity in people with schizophrenia.
Declaration of interestR.I.G.H. received fees for lecturing, consultancy work and attendance at conferences from the following: Boehringer Ingelheim, Eli Lilly, Janssen, Lundbeck, Novo Nordisk, Novartis, Otsuka, Sanofi, Sunovion, Takeda, MSD. M.J.D. reports personal fees from Novo Nordisk, Sanofi-Aventis, Lilly, Merck Sharp & Dohme, Boehringer Ingelheim, AstraZeneca, Janssen, Servier, Mitsubishi Tanabe Pharma Corporation, Takeda Pharmaceuticals International Inc.; and, grants from Novo Nordisk, Sanofi-Aventis, Lilly, Boehringer Ingelheim, Janssen. K.K. has received fees for consultancy and speaker for Novartis, Novo Nordisk, Sanofi-Aventis, Lilly, Servier and Merck Sharp & Dohme. He has received grants in support of investigator and investigator-initiated trials from Novartis, Novo Nordisk, Sanofi-Aventis, Lilly, Pfizer, Boehringer Ingelheim and Merck Sharp & Dohme. K.K. has received funds for research, honoraria for speaking at meetings and has served on advisory boards for Lilly, Sanofi-Aventis, Merck Sharp & Dohme and Novo Nordisk. D.Sh. is expert advisor to the NICE Centre for guidelines; board member of the National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health (NCCMH); clinical advisor (paid consultancy basis) to National Clinical Audit of Psychosis (NCAP); views are personal and not those of NICE, NCCMH or NCAP. J.P. received personal fees for involvement in the study from a National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) grant. M.E.C. and Y.D. report grants from NIHR Health Technology Assessment, during the conduct of the study; and The Leicester Diabetes Centre, an organisation (employer) jointly hosted by an NHS Hospital Trust and the University of Leicester and who is holder (through the University of Leicester) of the copyright of the STEPWISE programme and of the DESMOND suite of programmes, training and intervention fidelity framework that were used in this study. S.R. has received honorarium from Lundbeck for lecturing. F.G. reports personal fees from Otsuka and Lundbeck, personal fees and non-financial support from Sunovion, outside the submitted work; and has a family member with professional links to Lilly and GSK, including shares. F.G. is in part funded by the National Institute for Health Research Collaboration for Leadership in Applied Health Research & Care Funding scheme, by the Maudsley Charity and by the Stanley Medical Research Institute and is supported by the by the Biomedical Research Centre at South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust and King's College London.
Impact Sensitivity and Ignition Mechanisms of Nanoaluminum-poly(perfluorinated methacrylate) Nanocomposites
- Lauren A. Morris, Darla Graff Thompson, Racci DeLuca, Ian Shelburne, I. Emre Gunduz, Steven F. Son, Chris D. Haines
-
- Journal:
- MRS Advances / Volume 3 / Issue 17 / 2018
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 06 April 2018, pp. 887-903
- Print publication:
- 2018
-
- Article
- Export citation
-
Nanoenergetic composites are of overwhelming interest to the Department of Defense because of the higher power output and the ability to finely tune the ignition thresholds of these composites. Recently, several variants of a nanoaluminum-poly(perfluorinated methacrylate) (AlFA) have been synthesized and optimized for a variety of applications including reactive warhead liners and bullet spotters. While conventional techniques such as thermal analysis and bomb calorimetry can be used to characterize the reaction mechanism and energy output of AlFA composites, characterizing their dynamic behaviour is more challenging. Bullet spotter applications require a material to be impact sensitive at very low velocities, yet be adequately insensitive. Several live-fire tests were conducted which revealed the AlFA50 material reacted consistently upon target impact at high velocities, but unreliably at very low velocities. In an effort to better understand the fundamental impact ignition mechanism and to determine the impact velocity threshold of AlFA50 a series of Taylor gas gun experiments were conducted. It was determined that the light-initiation mechanism was consistent with a pinch mechanism, and that the ignition velocity threshold was near 74 m/s. Based on these results, it was hypothesized that the addition of a filler material could be used to sensitize the AlFA50, and that Asay shear impact testing could be used to determine a more optimal shape of such inclusions. Experiments performed using the Asay shear impact test setup confirmed the pinch ignition mechanism, but observations also revealed that the size of the pinch point was important. Finally, it was shown that the addition of large glass beads (> 1mm in diameter) was effective at sensitizing the AlFA50 material at high and low velocities, with ignition observed at impact velocities as low as 35 m/s.
The Ontario Neurodegenerative Disease Research Initiative (ONDRI)
- Sali M. K. Farhan, Robert Bartha, Sandra E. Black, Dale Corbett, Elizabeth Finger, Morris Freedman, Barry Greenberg, David A. Grimes, Robert A. Hegele, Chris Hudson, Peter W. Kleinstiver, Anthony E. Lang, Mario Masellis, William E. McIlroy, Paula M. McLaughlin, Manuel Montero-Odasso, David G. Munoz, Douglas P. Munoz, Stephen Strother, Richard H. Swartz, Sean Symons, Maria Carmela Tartaglia, Lorne Zinman, ONDRI Investigators, Michael J. Strong
-
- Journal:
- Canadian Journal of Neurological Sciences / Volume 44 / Issue 2 / March 2017
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 22 December 2016, pp. 196-202
-
- Article
-
- You have access Access
- Open access
- HTML
- Export citation
-
Because individuals develop dementia as a manifestation of neurodegenerative or neurovascular disorder, there is a need to develop reliable approaches to their identification. We are undertaking an observational study (Ontario Neurodegenerative Disease Research Initiative [ONDRI]) that includes genomics, neuroimaging, and assessments of cognition as well as language, speech, gait, retinal imaging, and eye tracking. Disorders studied include Alzheimer’s disease, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, frontotemporal dementia, Parkinson’s disease, and vascular cognitive impairment. Data from ONDRI will be collected into the Brain-CODE database to facilitate correlative analysis. ONDRI will provide a repertoire of endophenotyped individuals that will be a unique, publicly available resource.
Acknowledgments
- Morris Morley, Macquarie University, Sydney, Chris McGillion, Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, New South Wales
-
- Book:
- Reagan and Pinochet
- Published online:
- 05 February 2015
- Print publication:
- 02 February 2015, pp ix-x
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
6 - Toward Endgame
- Morris Morley, Macquarie University, Sydney, Chris McGillion, Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, New South Wales
-
- Book:
- Reagan and Pinochet
- Published online:
- 05 February 2015
- Print publication:
- 02 February 2015, pp 239-280
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
A number of assumptions concerning the situation in Chile had become fixed in the minds of Secretary of State George Shultz, other high-ranking Department officials, and Ambassador Harry Barnes by summer 1987. Chief among these was that the slowness of the regime to take concrete steps to advance the transition process (principally those measures needed to genuinely open up opportunities for antiregime forces to mobilize and campaign) raised more than suspicions about the military’s ultimate commitment to return the country to democratic rule. Most policy makers were convinced that Pinochet intended to stay in power. Shultz, in particular, worried that the General’s determination to do so had seen him “consciously diminishing possibilities for an orderly transition” and, were he to put himself forward as a candidate in the presidential plebiscite in 1988, the effect would be to “dangerously polarize Chile.” As to the opposition, it failed to inspire confidence in Washington, let alone among the regime leadership, as a potential alternative government: it was too divided for the comfort of either; too reluctant to fully embrace the plebiscite route for the transition from military to civilian government as laid down by Pinochet; and too far away from presenting a credible – and acceptable – policy platform. Most infuriating of all, Washington had very little influence over events in Chile and Pinochet had made it repeatedly clear that, ultimately, he cared little for how it was exercised.
3 - Dead Ends in Chile Policy
- Morris Morley, Macquarie University, Sydney, Chris McGillion, Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, New South Wales
-
- Book:
- Reagan and Pinochet
- Published online:
- 05 February 2015
- Print publication:
- 02 February 2015, pp 105-146
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
By the beginning of Ronald Reagan’s second term, a number of factors were conspiring to make a gradual change in U.S. policy toward Chile inevitable. Prominent among these, in the most general sense, had been Reagan’s speech to the British Parliament in June 1982, in which he committed the United States to promoting “freedom and democracy” as a matter of principle throughout the world. The context for, and background to, this speech was the American President’s deeply held belief that the Soviet Union was an “evil empire,” utterly untrustworthy, and should eventually be consigned to history unless it was willing to fundamentally transform its society, politically and economically. The more immediate trigger was Reagan’s support for the Solidarity movement in Poland, which was posing a major challenge to the Soviet-backed government of General Wojciech Jaruzelski.
That speech had important repercussions. First, Reagan’s commitment did not sit well with the wholehearted support of a military strongman such as General Augusto Pinochet and left the White House open to the charge of double standards – supporting democracy where it served U.S. interests in the struggle against leftist movements and regimes, especially in Central America, but exempting dictatorships perceived as valued allies for strategic, political, or economic reasons. Indeed, in the closing months of 1984, pressure was again building inside Congress to apply tougher measures against Chile in response to the concern of some legislators that the administration, despite its lofty rhetoric, was simply choosing to ignore Pinochet’s continued repression. Second, the London speech gave some latitude to those State Department officials eager to pursue policy approaches beyond the strictures of the Kirkpatrick Doctrine and what it implied for Washington’s relations with anticommunist Third World autocrats. Jeane Kirkpatrick’s departure in early 1985 provided an opportunity to contest her interpretation and influence, especially in the White House. “[W]e started taking a different approach to Chile,” recalled a senior U.S. official, and simultaneously “started to draw new lessons from the fall of the Shah in Iran and of Somoza in Nicaragua.”
Primary and Archival Sources
- Morris Morley, Macquarie University, Sydney, Chris McGillion, Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, New South Wales
-
- Book:
- Reagan and Pinochet
- Published online:
- 05 February 2015
- Print publication:
- 02 February 2015, pp 325-330
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
1 - In from the Cold
- Morris Morley, Macquarie University, Sydney, Chris McGillion, Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, New South Wales
-
- Book:
- Reagan and Pinochet
- Published online:
- 05 February 2015
- Print publication:
- 02 February 2015, pp 26-67
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
The Reagan administration came into office so determined to reverse the tone and nature of U.S. foreign policy as it had developed under President Jimmy Carter that one senior official in the ARA imagined his new superiors “felt that they were conducting a hostile takeover.” The atmosphere, he said, “was very much that nobody here could be trusted.” Transition team members, recalled Carter’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs David Aaron, “were not interested in being briefed on anything.” Robert Pastor, the NSC’s Latin American staffer, encountered the icy nature of the transition environment in a meeting with incoming NSC Adviser Richard Allen: “Even though these people who were coming in represented much of what I disagreed with, I felt that as an American official I should be prepared to help them and brief them. Not only did Dick Allen express disinterest at best but he said to me ‘You’d better be out of that office at noon on January 20 or police are going to come and take you out of that office.’” On the other hand, Reagan’s Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, had quite a different view of the transition dynamics. “I found no great enthusiasm in the Department of State for the Reagan Administration,” he would later write. “The fear was abroad that a legion of right-wing activists was going to march in and start conducting American diplomacy according to the rules of a political rally.” The predominant view of Carter’s Latin American policy among the newcomers, according to a senior career Foreign Service Officer at the time, was that it had angered political allies, especially military regimes, and that “we should stop meddling and telling them what they ought to do with respect to their own internal situations and human rights. They were good anti-communists and wanted to be our friends. We should make the most of it.”
Abbreviations and Acronyms
- Morris Morley, Macquarie University, Sydney, Chris McGillion, Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, New South Wales
-
- Book:
- Reagan and Pinochet
- Published online:
- 05 February 2015
- Print publication:
- 02 February 2015, pp xi-xiv
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Introduction
- Morris Morley, Macquarie University, Sydney, Chris McGillion, Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, New South Wales
-
- Book:
- Reagan and Pinochet
- Published online:
- 05 February 2015
- Print publication:
- 02 February 2015, pp 1-25
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
During the first three decades of the twentieth century, the United States transformed itself from a dominant regional into a competitive global power, all the while projecting its power abroad driven less by a desire “to make the world safe for democracy” than to put down nationalist threats to an expanding U.S. capital and commerce. Throughout the Cold War era, the gap between idealistic rhetoric and policy practice showed no signs of closing: the verbal commitment to promoting democracy by American presidents “with few exceptions…was distinctly secondary to the U.S. quest for private economic opportunity and public support for military-dominated regimes that would maintain order.”
Between 1898 and 1933, the principal objective of U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere – based on repeated military interventions and economic pressures – was to create a gaggle of client regimes in Central America and the Caribbean, which culminated in Franklin Roosevelt’s announcement of a Good Neighbor Policy. From then on, through the end of the 1950s, Washington’s policy toward Latin America gave priority to establishing a “closed economy in an open world.” Politically, this translated into supporting “dependable and weak” anticommunist regimes, irrespective of their origins or how they ruled. In pursuit of this overarching objective, successive administrations approved of, and accommodated, both “stability” achieved within a democratic context and “stability” imposed by brutal, autocratic governments. During the 1960s and early 1970s, maximum flexibility became the justification for diplomatic recognition of armed forces’ illegal seizures of power. Starting with the Kennedy administration’s approval of the January 1961 military coup in El Salvador, U.S. support for democracy in Latin America, in other words, remained selective and contingent rather than universal and principled.
7 - Return to the Fold
- Morris Morley, Macquarie University, Sydney, Chris McGillion, Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, New South Wales
-
- Book:
- Reagan and Pinochet
- Published online:
- 05 February 2015
- Print publication:
- 02 February 2015, pp 281-311
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
The presidency of George H. Bush from January 1989 to January 1993 coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of its Eastern European bloc, and the emergence of a unipolar world where the United States was the only superpower. As momentous as these changes were, they did not result in a fundamental reevaluation of U.S. foreign policy goals. In appearance and style, the Bush administration initially leaned away from the emotionally charged and ideologically driven policy of the Reagan years to a more prudent and pragmatic approach in dealing with the Third World in particular. But Washington’s new enthusiasm for solving outstanding problems through diplomacy rather than confrontation was, as events were to show, conditional and largely a function of the need to adapt to a new global reality that denied U.S. policy makers compelling national security arguments to justify interventionist policies and created opportunities for political settlements to a number of regional conflicts.
In his inaugural address, Bush embraced his predecessor’s rhetoric about the need to support democracy and free market economies. The “day of the dictator is over,” the new President declared, and the totalitarian era was passing: “great nations of the world are moving toward democracy [and] freedom [and] toward free markets through the door to prosperity.” For all that, the Bush White House would continue to emphasize the necessity of American global leadership, in the process subordinating the ambitions of competitor allies in Europe and Japan to Washington’s interests. “American leadership,” Bush insisted, meant “economic, political, and military” leadership and in all three respects embodied “a hard-nosed sense of American self-interest.” This dictated the maintenance of large, Cold War–sized military and intelligence budgets, now justified on the basis of the need to maintain worldwide stability (rather than the containment of communism) and to deal with new and continuing threats posed by rogue states, terrorism, and international drug trafficking. In the Third World, the collapse of the Soviet bloc gave an enormous boost to American power, first by eliminating any significant counterweight to U.S. objectives or power projections, and second by increasing the costs to those regimes seeking to pursue alternative economic and political strategies now more vulnerable to hostile initiatives by the dominant imperial state.
Contents
- Morris Morley, Macquarie University, Sydney, Chris McGillion, Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, New South Wales
-
- Book:
- Reagan and Pinochet
- Published online:
- 05 February 2015
- Print publication:
- 02 February 2015, pp vii-viii
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
5 - Abandoning Pinochet
- Morris Morley, Macquarie University, Sydney, Chris McGillion, Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, New South Wales
-
- Book:
- Reagan and Pinochet
- Published online:
- 05 February 2015
- Print publication:
- 02 February 2015, pp 199-238
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Entering 1987, the Reagan administration faced a major challenge to restore a degree of coherence and credibility to its foreign policy-making processes in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal involving illegal arms transfers to the Nicaraguan rebels. White House intervention in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America did not touch directly on Chile policy, but it did change the cast of characters previously involved in the debate and eventually altered the balance of influence between the various foreign policy agencies, damaging the reputation of the NSC and the CIA and restoring a leading role to George Shultz and the State Department in the overall conduct of foreign policy.
Although not at the top of the Reagan foreign policy agenda, Chile would rise to prominence at regular intervals – surrounding deliberations of the UNHRC and annual UNGA meetings, when the Pinochet regime’s human rights record came under scrutiny and when Chilean loan requests came before the MDBs. As well, Chile was fast becoming a standout concern in Latin America as other military regimes passed power back to democratically elected governments, and it was regarded by many within the administration as the sole major example the White House could cite to demonstrate that its professed commitment to democracy included targeting right-wing dictatorships in the region.
In contrast to the difficulties Reagan and his senior foreign policy officials now confronted domestically, Pinochet was in as srong a position as ever.
2 - Turning the Tide
- Morris Morley, Macquarie University, Sydney, Chris McGillion, Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, New South Wales
-
- Book:
- Reagan and Pinochet
- Published online:
- 05 February 2015
- Print publication:
- 02 February 2015, pp 68-104
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Following the collapse of negotiations involving Interior Minister Sergio Jarpa and the AD, State Department Counselor Edward Derwinski arrived in Santiago in early November 1983 carrying a singular message for the Chilean government: with the recent transition from military rule to democracy in Argentina the previous month, Chile risked being the “odd man out” in the region vis-à-vis relations with Washington. Derwinski’s instructions from Motley were to “exert gentle but firm pressure” on the regime to negotiate an agreement with the moderate opposition on a transition timetable. In meetings with the opposition, Derwinski encountered an AD leadership that was “uniformly pessimistic” about the future of any dialogue, convinced that Jarpa’s “good intentions” would inevitably fall victim to Pinochet’s refusal to accept any erosion of his “dictatorial powers” and that this, in turn, would almost certainly “radicalize the political process” in ways that could only benefit “the far left.” The severity of the socioeconomic crisis reinforced the appeal of the more radical sectors of the opposition movement. Until further notice, Derwinski was told, the AD saw no alternative to returning to civilian disobedience and mass mobilization politics to put maximum pressure on the regime to make concessions, otherwise nothing would change. Nevertheless, at a press conference before his departure, Derwinski saw no contradiction in reaffirming the existing U.S. policy approach: “silent diplomacy is something we prefer.” A State Department policy review did not suggest otherwise. The “uncertainty” surrounding the domestic political landscape, it concluded, dictated that in the short term, U.S. interests “would be best served by maintaining a cooperative bilateral relationship with Chile” (meaning the junta) and working behind the scenes to get the regime and the nonradical opposition to agree on a transition timetable.
4 - Changing Tack
- Morris Morley, Macquarie University, Sydney, Chris McGillion, Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, New South Wales
-
- Book:
- Reagan and Pinochet
- Published online:
- 05 February 2015
- Print publication:
- 02 February 2015, pp 147-198
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
By 1986, the Chilean dictatorship seemed out of step with a transformed regional political landscape, and the nation was led by what Secretary of State George Shultz now pointedly called “the odd men out.” Within the State Department, the debate over Chile policy had decisively shifted in favor of a more activist effort to prod the ruling generals to improve the human rights situation and accelerate the democracy transition process. Driving this new approach were Shultz, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams, his deputy Robert Gelbard, Ambassador Harry Barnes, and their bureaucratic allies, who were, in turn, being continuously pressured by Congress where dwindling support for the autocratic regime was evidenced by the defection of previously uncommitted legislators more and more annoyed by “Pinochet’s continued intransigence and [the] persistence of severe human rights violations.” Yet making Pinochet and his more conservative advisers appreciate Washington’s commitment to this policy shift remained an uphill battle given a strong belief in Santiago that the regime still had the unstinting support of senior Defense and White House officials. This necessitated repeated messages to the regime leaders, often via Chilean Ambassador Hernán Errázuriz, that “there [were] no significant divergences within the administration on Chile policy” and that Ambassador Barnes had the President’s unqualified support.
Pinochet’s refusal to deal with the National Accord in a way that might advance the transition to democracy had a number of significant implications. First, it provided further evidence – if any was needed – of his total refusal to compromise or bend to opinions other than his own. The Accord was not a perfect arrangement from the military’s point of view: many of its signatories were divided by “old feuds and rivalries” and disagreed over some of the concessions the regime would have to make to warrant the opposition’s full cooperation. Nonetheless, those who signed the multiparty document had come close to accepting Pinochet’s transition plan in full.
Epigraph
- Morris Morley, Macquarie University, Sydney, Chris McGillion, Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, New South Wales
-
- Book:
- Reagan and Pinochet
- Published online:
- 05 February 2015
- Print publication:
- 02 February 2015, pp v-vi
-
- Chapter
- Export citation